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‘A hundred thousand welcomes’? Unionism, nationalism, partition and the
arrival of American forces in Northern Ireland in January 1942
Simon Topping*
University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK
This article analyses the responses of unionists and nationalists to the arrival of
American forces in Northern Ireland in January 1942, and how traditional
narratives, particularly those dealing with links to the United States, were
reordered in the light of this development. For unionists, it was an opportunity
to demonstrate a commitment to the war effort and reinforce a sense of
Britishness, particularly after efforts in 1940 to end partition in return for Éire’s
entry into the war. In addition, it offered the possibility to forge a bilateral
relationship with the United States, by being a good ally and resurrecting links
between Ulster and America. Nationalists saw the arrival as America
legitimising partition and were outraged that Éire’s government was not
consulted (despite having no jurisdiction). Ordinary Protestants and Catholics
were much more phlegmatic about the political implications of the Americans’
arrival, and after the initial burst of publicity, subsequent deployments garnered
much less publicity.
Keywords:Northern Ireland; SecondWorldWar; unionism; nationalism; de Valera;
United States; partition
On 26 January 1942, a hurried welcome party assembled at Belfast’s Dufferin Dock
to greet American servicemen who, as part of Operation Magnet, were the first to
formally step onto European soil.1 The Ulster Rifles’ band struck up the ‘Star
Spangled Banner’ as the Americans walked down the gangplank; officially the first
ashore was Milburn H. Henke of Minnesota, but amid the rigmarole of preparing
Henke for the history books, another ship had docked nearby and was already
landing troops as greetings were being made.2 Henke, who would receive three
hundred pieces of fan mail, had a German-born father and a mother of German
origin and told reporters that he had ‘come to give the Germans hell’; he had no
idea where he was going until a British sailor pointed out the Irish coastline.3 The
crowd grew during the day as news of the Americans’ arrival spread and the disem-
barkation continued. The Ulster Rifles played ‘The Stars and Stripes Forever’ and
‘Liberty Bell’, while the Americans sang ‘Marching Through Georgia’ on their
way to their barracks.4
The arrival of Americans marked a major turning point in the war and helped lift
two years of British despair, but it also had a particularly local impact in Northern
Ireland as it delighted unionist politicians and newspapers and outraged their nation-
alist counterparts in almost equal measure. The reaction of ordinary Protestants and
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Catholics was much more phlegmatic, with the former understandably pleased and the
latter more ambivalent than openly hostile towards the Americans.5 This article will
analyse the ways in which unionist and nationalist spokesmen, with partition as
their focal point, formulated responses and re-evaluated their relationships with the
United States, with unionists suddenly rediscovering historic bonds with the country
while nationalists, throughout Ireland, felt betrayed by a presumed traditional ally,
but their hyperbolic reaction served to further fortify partition. For unionists, it had
the unanticipated benefit of further integrating Northern Ireland within the British
war effort and an opportunity to project a sense of Britishness akin to the rest of
the United Kingdom.6 As will be demonstrated, the Americans had barely set foot
on dry land before these competing agendas tried to exploit their presence. The
primary focus of this piece, therefore, will be the ways in which these modified narra-
tives were utilised in response to the American presence, providing as it did a new –
and brief – public forum for arguments about the rights and wrongs of partition; it
will also examine the consequences of the arrival on local politics.
Nationalism was broadly united by partition, but the war exposed its self-defeat-
ing insularity, whereby its spokesmen viewed world events almost exclusively
through the lens of partition. Conversely, unionism profited from the war, as North-
ern Ireland’s role not only strengthened the union but American intervention also
enabled unionism to see a world beyond king, union and empire. For the first
time, Northern Ireland’s government at Stormont attempted to cultivate a positive
awareness of Northern Ireland within the United States. It did this by highlighting
Ulster’s role in American history and, through depicting Northern Ireland as a loyal
ally and a generous host, distinguished itself from neutral Éire. The war was, fur-
thermore, a chance to challenge the perceived duplicity of the British, specifically,
the return of the ‘Treaty ports’ to Éire in 1938 alongside serious discussions,
which all but excluded unionists, to end partition in return for Éire’s entry into
the war in June 1940, angrily labelled ‘treachery’ by Northern Ireland’s Prime Min-
ister James Craig.7 An altogether vaguer proposition came in December 1941,
immediately after Pearl Harbor, when Churchill telegraphed Taoiseach (Prime Min-
ister) of Éire, the American-born Éamon de Valera telling him it was ‘now or never’,
which initially appeared to be a renewal of the earlier offer; however, de Valera was
justifiably suspicious, and Churchill quickly backtracked.8 These discussions stoked
unionist paranoia but also, crucially, their failure enhanced Northern Ireland’s stra-
tegic value. In addition, the wartime experiences which Northern Ireland shared
with the rest of the United Kingdom, starting with the Belfast Blitz and culminating
in the presence of the Americans, made it demonstrably more ‘British’ by the end of
the conflict than at any time since 1921.
These circumstances raised the prospect of Northern Ireland forging a bilateral
relationship with the United States, independent of Britain and distinct from Éire.
Both unionists and nationalists would discover, however, that the American ‘occu-
pation’ was purely strategic and that the United States had little interest in Northern
Ireland beyond its convenient geography. The main consequences of this and the war
more generally for Northern Ireland would be a widening chasm between it and Éire,
making long-term reconciliation virtually impossible, closer ties with the rest of the
United Kingdom, and missing the admittedly outside opportunity to reconfigure
local sectarian loyalties.
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‘Don’t argue religion; don’t argue politics’
If the arrival of the American troops would not ultimately reshape the relationship
between the United States and Northern Ireland, these seemingly exotic young men
certainly roused the curiosity of a war-weary country. The unionist press, principally
the Northern Whig, was first to try to exploit the propaganda potential of the Amer-
icans, asking those with Irish surnames (most were mid-westerners, mainly of Swedish,
Polish and Danish descent) about Éire’s neutrality. Although not briefed about North-
ern Ireland, most of the Americans were savvy enough not to be compromised by
leading questions.9 The indifference of ordinary American soldiers about the political
situation was not mirrored among their commanders, who, without ever questioning
their right to be in Northern Ireland, were acutely aware that this was no ordinary part
of the United Kingdom. The Americans were keen not to take sides, but they also
realised that their men could become entangled in local frictions, either by being
attacked in nationalist areas or being seduced by the violent anti-British ideology of
Irish republicanism, which saw them banned from the Catholic Falls Road in
Belfast.10 Subsequent deployments were forbidden from talking to the press and
were issued with a Pocket Guide to Northern Ireland.11 This 37-page booklet discussed
local customs and how to behave, stressing that there were ‘two Irelands’. Its most
important advice consisted of ‘two excellent rules of conduct for the American
abroad. They are good rules anywhere but they are particularly important in
Ireland: (1) Don’t argue religion; (2) Don’t argue politics.’ With a sense of understate-
ment that would have impressed the local sense of irony, it warned that ‘Irish history is
endlessly complicated’.12 Isolated incidents aside, the Americans generally avoided
arguing religion and politics, and mixed well with both communities.
On 23 December 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed where best to send
American troops.13 Roosevelt harboured a suspicion of a large American military
presence in the United Kingdom but did suggest (or agree) that American troops
could garrison and defend Northern Ireland, while bombers would go to the British
mainland.14 The decision was partly strategic and partly political. It had a number
of major strategic benefits, including freeing most of the British garrison for warzones
such as North Africa; it would create an American presence in Europe and the United
States’ novice army would be able to continue training.15 The growing Far East crisis
at the start of 1942 was more urgent and, consequently, two of the four original div-
isions earmarked were diverted there. Three other waves were sent to Northern
Ireland during the next four months and 32,000 US soldiers would remain until even-
tually sent to North Africa in late 1942.16 These troops were not the only Americans in
Northern Ireland. As it was vital to the Battle of the Atlantic, American technicians
had been working on docks and airfields for months before Pearl Harbor under ‘Lend-
Lease’.17 Plans for American army bases were in place as early as January 1941 and
the Americans’ presence, ostensibly employed by the British government, was an
open secret throughout the year.18
The Americans could, in theory, have been sent anywhere in the United Kingdom,
relieved British troops and continued training, while leaving Northern Ireland as it
was. Northern Ireland was the one part of the United Kingdom where their presence
was likely to be controversial, due to Éire’s claim that it was part of its ‘national ter-
ritory’ and refusal to recognise the Stormont government, alongside centuries old sec-
tarianism. More controversial, however, would have been the occupation of Éire by
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British troops if the Germans invaded; in this eventuality, American aid would be
much more palatable than that of the ancient enemy.19 The British and Americans
recognised privately that the latter’s forces might have to ‘be prepared to move into
South [sic] Ireland for the defense thereof ’, something diplomatically difficult, if not
impossible, for the British to do.20 Later instructions stated that if an American inva-
sion became a necessity, then any resistance would be suppressed quickly and bru-
tally.21 Éire’s army made the same calculations and was split between units on its
southern coast to face a German invasion, and the rest on the Irish border to resist
the British and Americans if necessary.22
The political element was informed by personal enmities. Both Churchill and Roo-
sevelt disliked de Valera, viewing him with a mixture of exasperation, contempt and,
as the war progressed, growing animosity.23 They particularly resented Éire’s some-
times graceless neutrality, including failing to distinguish between the motivations
of the Allies and the Axis. Placing American troops in territory claimed by Éire, there-
fore, had the convenient bonus of riling a politician seen as, at worst, self-defeating,
and, at best, disingenuous, and someone who seemingly fostered Anglophobia to
bolster his domestic political position. That said, the Americans were not entirely dis-
missive of Éire’s sensitivities; for example, the force had the rather unwieldy official
title of ‘United States Army Forces in the British Isles’, shortened to USAFBI, as,
noted the New York Times, ‘calling it the American Expeditionary Force would
have likely affronted independent Éire’. The Americans were, nevertheless, employing
‘a subtle form of pressure, using Irish-American sympathy to get what Éire has thus far
been unwilling to grant’, in other words, American access to the former treaty ports.24
‘The close kinship between the United States and Ulster’
There had been much speculation on both sides of the border about the imminent
arrival of American troops; but as foreign policy and defence were the responsibilities
of London, Stormont was not consulted, merely informed of the decision.25 Stormont
was overjoyed about hosting the Americans. It would reinvigorate the union with
Great Britain, and thus secure partition, by helping to integrate it within the
broader war effort and it enhanced a sense of ‘Britishness’ (however loosely defined)
which unionists had been attempting, and failing, to foster since the inception of
the state.26 James Loughlin argues that due to sectarianism and the disputed creation
of Northern Ireland, unionists struggled to create a sense of Britishness consistent with
the ‘national myth of tolerance, compromise and peaceful evolutionary development’,
particularly as Northern Ireland’s faults were public and plentiful. Due to the war,
however, Stormont could appeal to unionist patriotism in a potentially more effective
way than the border issue had been in the 1930s. This had been employed pre-war,
Loughlin asserts, ‘to enforce political discipline among the Unionist population’
behind ‘a patriotic myth’, based around British symbols, ‘to simplify or ‘purify’, pol-
itical debate in a context of virtually permanent constitutional crisis’.27 Loughlin’s
analysis regarding the unionist fear of being subsumed into a Catholic state can
equally apply to the war, with the modification that, where previously the rallying
point for unionists had been negative, indeed, reactionary, they now had a wartime
crisis, and the crucial role of Northern Ireland within it, to construct and demonstrate
a more ‘British’ Britishness. After the tentative British offers to Éire to end partition in
1940, the American presence now presented Northern Ireland with a new and positive
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opportunity to ‘purify political debate’, reliant on appeals to a generalised British
sense of patriotism rather than sectarianism, enabling unionists to both reassert
their political dominance, and recast their Britishness, but without, as usual, any refer-
ence to discrimination against the Catholic minority.28 This process arguably began
with the Blitz (mirroring the mythical Blitz spirit), which gave Belfast a shared experi-
ence with other British cities, continued with the Battle of the Atlantic and was further
reinforced by being the first UK region to host the Americans.
Stormont devised a multifaceted response to the Americans: firstly, on a practical
level, it promoted good relations between Americans and locals, especially Protestants,
by creating hospitality committees.29 This would minimise tensions and friction, reflect
well on the government and aid the war effort. American troops were made, therefore,
enormously welcome and Stormont assiduously publicised, nurtured and memoria-
lised these efforts, while downplaying the problems the Americans generated.30 Sec-
ondly, and closely aligned, were formal and informal attempts to ingratiate the state
with the Americans, by being a good ally and indulgent host. Thirdly, Stormont,
aided by unionist newspapers, strove to remind America, and educate locals, about
the historic bonds between the United States and Ulster, noting the twelve presidents
of Ulster descent and the role Ulstermen played in the revolution, and sought to capi-
talise on a low point in America’s relationship with Éire by ‘selling’ Northern Ireland
in the United States.31 This latter aspect was not officially (and privately) articulated
until 1943, after correspondence between new Prime Minister Sir Basil Brooke and
David Gray, the sympathetic American minister in Dublin.32 Finally, conscious of
negativity surrounding Northern Ireland in the States, overt sectarianism was rare
from Stormont and the anti-Catholic bigotry of ministers, not least Brooke, was
seldom aired in public.33
In all of this, however, there was little self-examination by Stormont; there were
neither efforts to use the war to create a sense of ‘Northern Irishness’, sheltering
instead, as noted, behind a still vague Britishness, nor attempts to ameliorate con-
ditions for Catholics. These efforts, amid a shared crisis, may not have transcended sec-
tarian divisions and but could have portended future peacetime stability; the hiatus on
blatant sectarianism did not, however, long survive the war.34 The process of ingratiat-
ing Northern Ireland with the United States was apparent throughout the ‘occu-
pation’, but Brooke was much more receptive to it than his aged and moribund
predecessor, John M. Andrews, Northern Ireland’s inconvenient divisions were air-
brushed and replaced by propaganda which depicted the state, sometimes wistfully
styled as ‘little Ulster’, as loyal and homogeneous. This required a hurried resurrection
of sentimental ties between Ulster and the United States; ties subsumed into either
Scots-Irish or Irish American Diasporas.35 These were now to be celebrated uncriti-
cally alongside apparently shared values – such as democracy – in what the nationalist
Derry Journal contemptuously dismissed as ‘the mushroom show of specious regard
that the Six County Ascendancy has now conceived for the American Republic’.36
That the United States had broken away from the cherished British Empire was con-
veniently ignored or summarily dismissed by unionist spokesmen: ‘into the rights and
wrongs of that struggle it is unnecessary now to enter’, was the Belfast Telegraph’s
fudge when the topic became unavoidable in its coverage of 4 July celebrations.37
In his official greeting to the Americans, Andrews, who had become prime minister
upon Craig’s death in November 1940, praised Roosevelt in joining the fight against
‘ruthless barbarianism’ and stressed that the American ‘presence is a reminder of
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the close kinship… between the United States and Ulster’.38 At Stormont, Andrews
re-emphasised transatlantic links as, ‘bonds that can never be broken – bonds
created by kinship and language, identity and outlook, and a common faith in democ-
racy’. He also believed that the Americans would soon ‘experience the warm-hearted
hospitality that is so characteristic of our people’.39 As nationalists, bar the moderate
T.J. Campbell, a former editor of the Irish News, refused to take their seats, the only
opposition at Stormont was the Northern Ireland Labour Party’s (NILP) two MPs.
These, Jack Beattie, an anti-partition Protestant, and HarryMidgely, whowould even-
tually join the ruling Ulster Unionist Party, also greeted the Americans, Beattie ‘on
behalf of the working class people of Northern Ireland’.40
The Americans created a welcome distraction for Stormont. Alongside its sectar-
ian problems, Northern Ireland had suffered from poverty, social division and gener-
ally poor government since well before the war, indeed, arguably since its inception.41
Craig, prime minister since the state’s foundation, had become increasingly erratic,
viewed by Brian Barton as ruling ‘in characteristically dictatorial and whimsical
fashion, major decisions being taken hastily by the Prime Minister himself, or after
consultations with a select inner clique’.42 Craig at least had the foresight to
earmark the energetic Brooke as his successor; however, the Ulster Unionist Party
opted instead for the superannuated Andrews. Already seventy, one critic dismissed
Andrews as ‘just a provincial mill owner’, and he merely continued Craig’s policies
with essentially Craig’s cabinet.43 Such was the unpopularity of the government that
Craig’s North Down seat was lost in March 1941 to an independent unionist.44 The
mishandling defence preparations prior to the Blitz of April and May 1941, which
killed almost a thousand people and destroyed much of Belfast’s housing stock,
was, deservedly or not, seen as a reflection of incompetence of the Andrews govern-
ment and contributed to its eventual toppling two years later.45
‘Without permission’
The unionist press, primarily the News Letter, the Belfast Telegraph and the Northern
Whig in Belfast and the Sentinel in Londonderry, the former three working with Stor-
mont, played a leading role in acclaiming the Americans and publicising Ulster–
American links.46 In its editorial marking the arrival, the Telegraph was effusive
about the ‘great occasion’, declaring that ‘Mr Roosevelt was never neutral in mind
or heart’ before Pearl Harbor.47 ‘Yesterday the citizens of Ulster learned with pleasure
and satisfaction that contingents have already arrived’, declared the Sentinel.48 The
Sentinel also echoed Andrews’ sentiments about the ‘many ties of kinship which
have long bound Ulster with the great Republic of the West’.49 The Telegraph was
quick to juxtapose reactions in Northern Ireland and Éire, remarking upon ‘the
blaze of publicity’ in the British and American press, while ‘the Dublin papers,
cramped no doubt by the Censor’s blue pencil, have dismissed the historic event in
less than thirty lines’.50 Moreover, the Whig gleefully pointed out that de Valera
had ‘received flattering comment’ in German propaganda, which had declared: ‘the
manly attitude of the Irish Premier shows that neutrality and independence are
notions that can be maintained by weak nations against stronger opponents’.51
Irish nationalist press’s response was in marked contrast. The two main papers
were the Belfast-based Irish News and the Derry Journal; smaller, regional nationalist
papers followed their lead, however, without the vehemence of either.52 Both, but
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particularly the Journal, took grave exception to the American arrival. It reported at
length about the protests of both de Valera and local nationalist figures, and fully sup-
ported the former’s outrage against the deployment of American troops ‘without per-
mission’. The intemperate tone reflected not only a genuine belief in the wrongness of
partition, and legitimate Catholic grievances, especially in Londonderry, against Stor-
mont, but also a wilful and persistent misrepresentation of partition’s origins. In this
narrative, partition was imposed without the consent of the Irish people rather than
enshrined in the Anglo-Irish treaty, signed by an Irish delegation and ratified by the
provisional Irish parliament; moreover, arch anti-partitionist de Valera had, in fact,
voted for its continuation in 1925.53 Paul Bew sees this as indicative of the ‘self-refer-
ential culture of Irish nationalism [which] was ill-equipped to rise to the moral chal-
lenges of world war’; for example, the lack of empathy with European Jews and the
notion that ‘the most oppressed people in Europe in the 1940s were to be found in
Ireland’.54 This, even assuming the indignation was genuine, is certainly the case
regarding the Americans, yet it is also apparent that the nationalist press saw the
arrival as a way of internationalising partition, even if the rest of the world had
more pressing concerns.
De Valera was central to this and his widely reported protest focussed on the
nationalist view that, as ‘everyone knew’, partition had been imposed, ‘despite the
expressed will of the Irish people’, by the British.55 He compared this to ‘the former
partition of Poland’ and invoked Lincoln’s determination to prevent the ‘Partition
of the United States… even at the cost of fighting one of the bitterest civil wars in
history’.56 ‘The maintenance of the partition of Ireland’, he went on, ‘is as indefensible
as aggressions against small nations elsewhere which it is the avowed purpose of Great
Britain and the United States in this war to bring to an end.’57 The pro-de Valera Irish
Press referred to this as a ‘statement’, while the rest of the Irish and international press
spoke of a ‘protest’.
Professor Douglas Savory, an English-born Unionist MP at Westminster and
former history lecturer at Queen’s University, Belfast, offered a virtual line-by-line
rebuttal of de Valera’s statement, declaring it a distortion of facts ‘so extraordinary
that it was hard to believe that it was authentic’. In a letter to the Sentinel, he ques-
tioned the analogies between Poland, Norway, Belgium, Holland or the American
Civil War ‘and the deliberate and voluntary severance by the Twenty-Six Counties
of Southern Ireland from the United Kingdom’.58 He argued that personation, intimi-
dation and abstentionism were widespread in the 1918 general election that saw Sinn
Fein, demanding an all-island republic entirely independent of Britain, emerge as the
largest party in Ireland, and hardly the mandate that nationalists claimed. He con-
cluded that de Valera’s statement was ‘so extravagant that it scarcely deserves to be
taken seriously’.59 Regardless of some of the questionable aspects of the 1918 election,
Sinn Fein’s mandate was indisputable, but Savory’s broader deconstruction of de
Valera’s analogies was not without merit.
British Ambassador Sir JohnMaffey, who reported to Gray that ‘he had never seen
de Valera so depressed’, had informed De Valera of the coming of the Americans.60 At
the end of January 1942, de Valera told the American, British and Canadian represen-
tatives in Dublin that his words should not be viewed as a protest.61 John D. Kearney
the Canadian High Commissioner in Dublin recorded: ‘he felt obliged to make some
statement in case silence be interpreted as acquiescence in the status of partition. He
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also told me that he feared a worsening of relationships between Ireland and the
United States by reason of the presence of American troops’.62 This explanation
was an unconvincing, if typically artful, exercise in semantics, and the statement
was made with seemingly little regard for the potential it had to inflame tensions in
Northern Ireland. De Valera’s words were certainly taken as a protest by the United
States, particularly a furious Gray. He felt, according to T. Ryle Dwyer, that ‘de
Valera was playing petty politics in the midst of the war’, and wanted to impose sanc-
tions on Éire, but settled instead on the so-called absent treatment, an effort to sideline
Éire diplomatically.63 Gray later reflected that the protest ‘was probably inspired by
internal political considerations or by Mr de Valera’s estimate of them’.64 Dwyer
views the American arrival as simply the pretext for another of de Valera’s ‘ritualistic
denunciations of partition’, while Robert Fisk states that the protest ‘achieved no
purpose and was not expected to’, but its insensitivity angered the Americans by
implying a moral equivalence between the Allies and the Axis.65 De Valera felt that
his reaction was as temperate as could be expected, but the Americans disagreed.66
Roosevelt later remarked, according to Robert Brennan, Éire’s minister in Washing-
ton, DC, that ‘he was sorry Mr. de Valera had made the statement he did but, of
course, he knew he had to make a protest if only for appearance sake’, demonstrating
the official American view of de Valera’s motivation.67
Thomas Bartlett, in his discussion of the 1940 offer of Northern Ireland to Éire,
highlights de Valera’s cynicism: ‘whatever he may have said in public, ending partition
had never been a priority for de Valera’. Maintaining his supremacy within both Éire
and his own party, Fianna Fail, were de Valera’s priorities. He headed by far the
largest party in Éire, but formed a succession of minority governments; moreover,
he faced threats from extremists within his party, who were even more anti-partitionist
than he was. Maintaining neutrality was much more important than partition for de
Valera.68 The end of partition would have seen a huge demographic shift with
Ulster Protestants voting in the new state; therefore, as Bartlett concludes ‘De
Valera’s sovereign Ireland could not have survived the ending of partition, and de
Valera knew it’.69 Gray confronted de Valera about partition, noting that he would
rather appease his own hardliners than seek conciliation with unionists, even if the
latter could bring about an all-island state.70 There was a further paradox as, while
publically berating their arrival, de Valera privately facilitated the return of American,
and sometimes British, pilots grounded in Éire to their bases across the border, while
Axis combatants were interned for the war’s duration.71 Gray saw this as a tacit admis-
sion that de Valera’s protest was solely for public consumption rather than evidence of
genuine offence.72
De Valera’s protest was, ultimately, about saving face in the light of the uncomfor-
table and very public demonstration that, regardless of his rhetoric or Éire’s irredent-
ism, he had no say about events across the Irish border; he would have been deluded to
believe truly that the United States required his permission to land in Northern
Ireland. The starkness of this impotence would have been further reinforced had he
said nothing, but it was a politically risky strategy. Maffey advised that any public
protest would likely create anti-Irish feeling in both Britain and America.73 This
advice, and de Valera’s dubious logic, did not prevent repeated claims that the
entire island of Ireland as Éire’s sovereign territory, a constant irritation throughout
the war.74 Roosevelt was contemptuous about the protests. Brennan told Under Sec-
retary of State SumnerWelles that the presence of US troops ‘was regarded by the Irish
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government and people as official sanction of the partition of Ireland’.75 There was
also an understandable fear within Éire that America would invade the country. Roo-
sevelt’s private response was ‘that he only wished they would’.76
‘As welcome in Northern Ireland as the Germans are in Norway’
Andrews relished the opportunity to put one over de Valera, asserting that ‘Éire’s fate,
as well as our own’ depended upon the war’s outcome. As for partition, he cited the
Government of Ireland Act of 1920, and blamed de Valera for partition and the
increasing divisions between Northern Ireland and Éire, making the entirely plausible
observation that, ‘It is they who, by their policy and actions both before and since the
outbreak of war, have widened the gulf ’. Andrews also condemned the ‘folly’ of
denying Britain access to Éire’s naval bases, as ‘Éire is no less danger of invasion’;
by contrast, ‘Northern Ireland is in the fight for freedom, and intends to see it
through’.77 Andrews was able, then, to reassert that Northern Ireland’s commitment
to the war effort distinguished it from de Valera and Éire.
The 75-year-old unionist Mayor of Londonderry, Sir Frederick James Simmons,
arose from his sickbed to welcome American officers and dismiss de Valera’s ‘impu-
dent protest’. He deemed de Valera’s objection ‘coming from a neutral source’, to
be ‘in utterly bad taste’, as de Valera had lost Northern Ireland in 1920 and ‘Britain
was adhering to the bargain then made’.78 At the civic reception for American officers
at the city’s Guildhall, Simmons declared: ‘We don’t take any recognition of those who
think that you are here without being invited, because you are welcome guests’.
Simmons also greeted the Americans in Gaelic, a politicised language usually
viewed suspiciously by unionists, with the Irishman’s welcome of ‘Céad mile fálte’
(‘a hundred thousand welcomes’).79 Simmons owed his office to the gerrymandering
of electoral boundaries which perpetuated unionist rule, despite a nationalist majority
in the city; it is doubtful, however, that he had this irony in mind when avoided
mention of liberty or democracy.80
Neither de Valera nor anyone else in Éire’s political establishment felt obliged to
refute Andrews, Simmons or Savory. Éire’s press reported none of this, technically,
and politically conveniently, muzzled by strict censorship; thus, any engagement
with unionism would have implicitly legitimised it and Northern Ireland. De
Valera’s protest was, nevertheless, a rare boon for unionism, exposing his conceit
that he was Ireland’s rightful ruler as the fallacy it was, and permitting unionist
leaders to project a positive image of a patriotic and steadfast Northern Ireland.
The reality was, however, that the British and Americans could operate with impunity
in Northern Ireland, a geographically convenient pawn regardless of what unionists
thought, and there was nothing de Valera, Andrews or anyone else could do.
When Unionists endeavoured to recruit Westminster for their attacks on de Valera
its public reaction was muted to the point of silence. Savory raised the issue in the
House of Commons, but the British establishment ignored the protests and made
no statement.81 When pressed, the Dominions Office confidentially told Stormont
that it was not ‘necessary or desirable for them to issue any reply’, which was not to
be construed as ‘any way ignoring the position of Northern Ireland’. This was made
clear in December 1937 when the then Irish Free State’s new constitution laid claim
to the whole island and renamed itself ‘Éire’. The British government refused to
‘recognize that the adoption of the name “Éire” or “Ireland”… involves any right
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of territorial jurisdiction’ over Northern Ireland: ‘This remains the position’.82 The
Dominions Office’s private assurances were doubtless welcome, and would have par-
tially assuaged unionist paranoia, but London deemed it altogether more politic to
say nothing publicly in the hope of future wartime co-operation with Éire.
Nationalists were largely ambivalent about the outcome of the war, the only
wartime issue that raised hackles was conscription, mooted but never introduced in
Northern Ireland; otherwise, all that mattered was partition.83 The fervour of the
anti-American protests was, in effect, an attempted diversion from nationalism’s pol-
itical frustrations, and the misassumption that America was Ireland’s natural ally, as
much as displays of genuine outrage. Reactions particularly in Londonderry illus-
trated this. Patrick Maxwell, Nationalist MP for Foyle stated: ‘the Americans are as
welcome in Northern Ireland as the Germans are in Norway’:
We shall ignore the American forces as far as possible, but there is no discourtesy
intended. There is nothing physically we can do to throw them out or we would do so.
We consider the landings of the Americans is an aggression against the Irish nation.
The closest analogy would be if the Japanese landed in Occupied France to help the
Germans.84
Joseph E. Stewart, the Nationalist MP for East Tyrone proclaimed: ‘Mr de Valera’s
declaration is shared by all Nationalists in the six counties… the people of Ireland
should have been consulted before the army of another country, however friendly,
should have been brought into Irish soil. No Irishman ever agreed to the partition
of Ireland’.85 Parochialism, misrepresenting of history and contorted analogies
served to demonstrate further the isolation of nationalists in Northern Ireland.
The Journal editorialised at length about the arrival of the Americans, ‘without any
reference to the Irish government’, arguing that it was contrary to America’s ideals and
was, among many other complaints, propping up ‘Orange rule in this unnatural
enclave’. All other issues, including the war, were subservient to ending partition
and as ‘the fact that the age-long aspirations of National Sovereignty have been
plainly impugned… the Irish leader could not do other than protest as he did’. As
a result, this notional leader was obliged not to accept anything ‘other than all Irish
control of all the national territory’.86 Nationalist protests, therefore, saw the Ameri-
cans as explicitly supporting partition, but there is also the inference that had the
‘legitimate’ government been asked, then they would have been welcomed, which,
of course, was entirely at odds with Éire’s neutrality and, certainly at this point in
the conflict, de Valera’s attitude towards the Allies. The protests also stressed friendly
Irish–American links and that these would not be risked by violence against American
troops.
While the responses of the Journal and other voices within nationalism were pre-
dictable, some calmer heads saw them as self-defeating in pursuit of their ultimate
goal. W.S. Moody of Strabane wrote perceptively to the Journal complaining about
‘the spectacle of leaders of Irish Nationalism helping to defeat the immediate or
near future prospects of an all-Ireland Republic, by alienating and antagonising Amer-
ican opinion’ which, he pointed out, had previously wrought concessions from the
British. ‘To gratuitously throw away further potential support and sympathy’, he con-
tinued, ‘for the sake of a national hyper-dignity to be recognised by the world to some
far distant and remote Utopian era… compels admiration for the heart but certainly
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not the head’. He believed that de Valera’s co-operation with the Americans would
have blindsided unionism and potentially fatally undermined Stormont: ‘but no, the
leaders of Irish Nationalism in their recently acquired dignity and status of neutrality
can be relied on to scorn all such base compromise… thus helping to assure and per-
petuate Partition’. Instead, de Valera, Maxwell and others were abetting unionism:
‘the fondness of Irish Nationalist leaders for making such defiant gestures and out-
bursts exceeds their sincere desire for a united Ireland; otherwise they would not so
patently allow their means to defeat their end’.87 Although ignoring the potentially
huge cost of the war to Éire, Moody’s analysis was much more nuanced than anything
offered either nationalists or unionists and its publication in the staunchly nationalist
Journal perhaps tacitly acknowledged this. Certainly, it is barely conceivable that
nationalist spokesmen genuinely believed that their bellicosity would garner American
support for their singular ambition, regardless of how aggrieved they claimed to be;
moreover, they clearly overestimated Irish–Americans’ commitment to their ancestral
homeland and their importance in American politics.88
There was much publicity in the US about the arrival, both in newspapers and
newsreels.89 Alongside cheery coverage of the troops themselves and the positive
impact upon British morale, the New York Times’ assessment was circumspect, recog-
nising the complexities of the situation. It explained that the ‘Sons of United States sol-
diers who had fought in World War I’ had ‘set foot upon a troubled land.’ It also noted
that American conscripts were in a place without conscription, and had come
into one of those small little trouble spots of the British Empire. It is industrial, mountai-
nous and Tory – a British controlled foothold on the island of Ireland. The Americans
had landed in a strange country. It is proud and loud in its declarations of fealty to
Empire.90
This downbeat, and broadly fair, view hinted at the potentially problematic nature of
the American presence and recognised that Ulster’s doughty self-image was at odds
with the reality of an impoverished, insular and divided country.
The Nation dedicated an entire supplement of its 31 January 1942 issue to Ireland.
It reminded Éire of, among many things, the role America played in Irish indepen-
dence and The Nation’s wholehearted support for this, urging it to join the war
effort in due recognition. It warned that Éire ‘must inevitably forfeit American sympa-
thy and support and take its place, when the war is over, with the anti-democratic
nations at the peace table’.91 The following issue included an article entitled ‘Irrespon-
sible Neutrality’, which described de Valera as ‘churlish’, contending that Éire’s ‘old
grievances blind it to present dangers’, and warning that partition could only end
‘by agreement with the Protestant majority… unless it is prepared to wage civil war
and kill, imprison, or deport 600,000 recalcitrants’.92 The war, it continued, had
made Northern Ireland indispensable to Britain; in fact, it was ‘very probably respon-
sible for Britain’s continued existence’, which, in turn, made the likelihood of it being
abandoned to Éire even more remote.93
Other American newspapers were more confrontational. The New York Herald
Tribune highlighted the disparity between de Valera’s outspokenness about the Amer-
icans’ arrival and his silence after the German bombing of Belfast in 1941. It referred
to his statement as
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a gratuitous piece of impertinence. Éire has been treated very tenderly in this war. The
devastating raids on Belfast appear to have gone unrebuked in Éire, but when the
United States troops landed in what is certainly de facto belligerent territory, the protests
came in battalions.94
Criticism also came from Congress, where, reported the Whig, ‘Congressmen of Irish
extraction’disagreedwith de Valera. Republican Congressman J. O’Brien of NewYork
was ‘elated’ that American troops had arrived and ‘surely he [de Valera] realizes that if
Britain and America should fall, Éire will be at Hitler’s mercy’. He felt that due to their
strong links, Éire should co-operate with the United States and set aside its differences
with Britain.95 The Derry Journal, however, reported another congressman complain-
ing that the troops should have gone to the Philippines as ‘Britain had 3,500,000 men
armed to the teeth’, indicating the political dimension to the decision.96
‘Irresponsible or wrong-minded people might misinterpret this’
For all the bravura of unionists, paranoia about their status and London’s commit-
ment persisted. At a meeting of the War Cabinet’s Defence Committee concerning
the imminent arrival, Andrews was
most anxious that no impression should be given that we were handing over responsibility
for the defence of Northern Ireland to the United States. Irresponsible or wrong-minded
people might misinterpret this as the first step to handing Northern Ireland over to Éire.97
Andrews’ concerns required, to say the least, not only a considerable leap of logic, and
reflected not only his personal insecurities and muddled reasoning but also as a still
raw resentment of the 1940 offer to end partition. His request that some British
forces remain was granted, but it was in case sectarian violence erupted, exposing
the persistent unionist view that nationalists were not only disloyal but also a potential
fifth column. Sir Alexander Maxwell, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home
Office, stated that ‘a proportion of British troops’ would remain in case of ‘civil dis-
turbance’ as ‘it would be preferable if these troops were British’.98 Alan Brooke, the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, an Ulsterman and Sir Basil Brooke’s uncle, con-
firmed that ‘it was intended to leave British troops for liaison and internal security pur-
poses’.99 There was an implicit fear that, as in the Great War, violent Irish
republicanism would foment trouble during an international crisis. The retention of
some British troops mollified Andrews.
British forces in Northern Ireland, therefore, could be deployed during civil strife
but this was not something that could be reasonably or realistically be expected of the
Americans. Although the inference was that they could be called upon, it is difficult to
countenance a situation, beyond persistent Irish Republican Army (IRA) attacks on
US troops, where they would agree, or be sufficiently provoked, to do so.100 Unbe-
knownst to the British authorities, an American commander had informed the
IRA, through the US forces’ head Catholic Chaplain that their soldiers would
remain uninvolved in Northern Ireland’s internal problems.101 The terrorist organis-
ation ignored this. The angry rhetoric of Irish nationalism offered a convenient
pretext for the IRA to launch a terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland in April
1942, while a manifesto found at an arms dump in August explicitly threatened the
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Americans and its language reflected the earlier nationalist protests.102 The campaign
failed to embroil the Americans and was suppressed by the end of the year.
Unionism, like nationalism, avoided self-analysis in the wake of the American
arrival and unionist politicians and newspapers were content to project an unproble-
matised vision of Northern Ireland. To this end, the American presence was cele-
brated, links between Ulster and the United States emphasised, while downplaying
any negative aspects, such as petty crime and anti-social behaviour, as was any hint
of local disunity regarding the war effort. The unionist press reported some troops
being ‘billeted with a ghost’, the arrival of ‘Doughgirls’, and later gave extensive cover-
age to 4 July celebrations and Thanksgiving.103 The Telegraph began publishing a
‘Home News Corner for Americans in Ulster’ in February, and, from December
1943, a local version of the US forces newspaper Stars and Stripes.104 At times, it
was impossible to ignore adverse consequences of the American presence, for
example the acquittal in April 1942 of an American soldier of manslaughter after
shooting a bus driver whose vehicle strayed into a military convoy.105 Yet even this,
and later killings, served to reinforce American values as high-profile courts martial
were open to the public, widely reported, and because justice was perceived to be
done, seemingly prevented rifts between Americans and locals.106 The scandal gener-
ated also offered a welcome wartime distraction, as did visits from a steady stream of
American celebrities and public figures.107
Ordinary Protestants and Catholics seemed much less interested in the consti-
tutional implications of the American presence than their newspapers and politicians;
there was, nevertheless, a clear delineation between Protestant and Catholic attitudes.
The Ministry of Information (MOI) reported in September that ‘with a few honorable
exceptions… . The welcome given to the Americans has been overwhelming on the
part of the Unionists and Protestants – those loyal to the British Crown and resolved
to maintain the British connection’.108 Tom Harrison, the head of Mass Observation,
earlier stated that Protestants were pro-American not only because their presence
strengthened the war effort, but also because they served, ‘almost unconsciously as
a strengthening of the forces of order against the constant fear of Catholic (National-
ist) trouble’. Catholics were ‘largely antagonistic, although it is only a minority who
are strongly so, many individual Catholics are thoroughly in favour of the Ameri-
cans’.109 The US consul in Belfast, the recently arrived Parker Buhrman, in an early
report to Gray reached similar conclusions, stating that the Americans were well
received by both communities.110 Buhrman worried constantly, however, about Amer-
icans being drawn into local problems. By September, he was reporting that ‘Quite a
number’ of Americans being ‘brutally assaulted under the cover of darkness’ by ‘IRA
partisans’, while ‘Irish American soldiers also lend ready ear to IRA trouble
makers’.111 This concern was exaggerated by largely unfounded fears, from both Stor-
mont and the Americans, that Irish–American soldiers would be susceptible to Irish
republicanism.
‘Céad mile fálte?’
The fanfare from unionists and handwringing of nationalists was absent from sub-
sequent American deployments, starting inMarch 1942, and the interest of local news-
papers even when Americans arrived in huge numbers from late 1943 was
comparatively subdued. This was partly because the military did not want to make
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a fuss, but also suggested that the earlier competing declarations of unionists and
nationalists were as much for public display as they were about principle.112 Stories
in the unionist press about American reactions to the idiosyncrasies of Ulster life con-
tinued, as did good-natured items about mutual culture shock, but newspapers only
propagandised the initial arrival. Brawling, drunkenness and minor criminality con-
tinued, but only occasionally against a sectarian backdrop, for example, when
young men on the Falls Road, purportedly members of the IRA, taunted Americans
after their defeat to the Germans at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in February 1943.113 On
the surface, the experience of Northern Ireland in many respects resembled the rest of
the United Kingdom, in that the Americans were ‘overpaid, oversexed and over here’
even while sectarianism remained a reduced, if still very real, feature of life and this
added dimension continued to set the region apart and complicated the American
presence.114
Northern Ireland fell into a wartime routine where the Americans were a fam-
iliar sight; a routine that would be punctuated by industrial unrest but never directly
threatened again by the conflict. Its comparative security, particularly after the
Battle of the Atlantic, removed it from the frontline and it became a diplomatic
and strategic sideshow.115 The Americans, nevertheless, still had to be managed as
well as eulogised. Stormont, led by a tireless Brooke and given virtual independence
by London, set about this with gusto and no little skill. Beyond coping with the
practical and social problems generated by the influx of tens of thousands of
young men, Stormont had to adjust policing and cede legal jurisdiction over US
troops. It also had to contend with American race relations, amend some of North-
ern Ireland’s more archaic social mores (opening cinemas on Sunday, for example)
and provide enough entertainment to try to keep Americans away from booze and
loose women, all of which it did as well as, and often better than, the rest of the
United Kingdom.116
The arrival of the Americans certainly strengthened partition, which helped
explain nationalism’s often-histrionic response and unionism’s unbridled joy. North-
ern Ireland’s role in the war, and Éire’s neutrality, made the end of partition in its after-
math even more unlikely; as Hennessey argues, the war ‘reinforced the psychological
gap between Ulster unionism and Irish nationalism’.117 The American presence, at
least at the outset, shone a useful spotlight on Stormont’s double standards, even if
nationalists’ principal focus was on partition, rather than the everyday experiences
of Catholics. Yet, Irish nationalism’s vociferous and obdurate attitude, its failure to
acknowledge, much less engage with, political realities, and refusal to seek compro-
mise with unionism, simply exacerbated the problem it purportedly sought to over-
come. Perhaps, however, this was the point: berating partition was more important
than ending it. Bitterly resented among Catholics, partition was a politically useful dis-
traction in Éire, and particularly for de Valera. The ‘hyper-dignity’ lamented by W.S.
Moody in the Derry Journal exemplified the counterproductive nature of nationalism:
quite simply, the louder the protests, the more entrenched partition became, and the
status quo suited unionists. Moreover, Stormont would use Éire’s threats and fear of
a disloyal minority to underpin its own position and refuse to countenance the
merest conciliation with the Catholic population or progressive elements within union-
ism, while becoming more integrated within the United Kingdom and reasserting
Northern Ireland’s Britishness.118 The victims of this unintentional political symbiosis
remained Northern Ireland’s Catholic minority, offered symbolism and little else from
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Éire, and suspicion and discrimination from Stormont. The arrival of the Americans,
who eschewed involvement in these ancient feuds, amply demonstrated the starkness
of Northern Ireland’s divisions, and between it and Éire and served to reinforce and
perpetuate partition, while drawing Northern Ireland closer to the rest of the
United Kingdom than it had been at any time since its inception.
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